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Abstract
In this paper we consider theories in which reality is described by some
underlying variables, λ. Each value these variables can take represents an
ontic state (a particular state of reality). The preparation of a quantum
state corresponds to a distribution over the ontic states, λ. If we make
three basic assumptions, we can show that the distributions over ontic
states corresponding to distinct pure states are non-overlapping. This
means that we can deduce the quantum state from a knowledge of the
ontic state. Hence, if these assumptions are correct, we can claim that
the quantum state is a real thing (it is written into the underlying variables
that describe reality). The key assumption we use in this proof is ontic
indifference - that quantum transformations that do not affect a given
pure quantum state can be implemented in such a way that they do not
affect the ontic states in the support of that state. In fact this assumption
is violated in the Spekkens toy model (which captures many aspects of
quantum theory and in which different pure states of the model have
overlapping distributions over ontic states). This paper proves that ontic
indifference must be violated in any model reproducing quantum theory
in which the quantum state is not a real thing. The argument presented in
this paper is different from that given in a recent paper by Pusey, Barrett,
and Rudolph. It uses a different key assumption and it pertains to a single
copy of the system in question.
1 Introduction
Ever since the Schroedinger wrote down his wave equation, people have won-
dered what kind of thing the wave function is. Perhaps the most basic question
one can ask is whether it is a real thing. That is, is there something in the
underlying reality of the world that corresponds to the wavefunction?
We start by assuming there is still some underlying reality, described by
some variables, λ. Sometimes these variables are called hidden variables. This
is a little inappropriate though since not all the variables have to be “hidden”
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[5]. Each λ describes a possible ontic state - a possible state of the underlying
reality. When a quantum state is prepared we imagine that it corresponds to a
probability distribution over ontic states. A different quantum state would, in
general, correspond to a different distribution over ontic states.
Spekkens has pioneered the idea that we might be able to provide an epis-
temic interpretation of the quantum state. He has constructed a toy theory [35]
(see also [19], [9, 10], [3]) which is capable of reproducing a substantial fraction
of the predictions of quantum theory. This toy theory has the property that,
for different pure states in the theory, the corresponding distribution over ontic
states overlap. Thus, there exist ontic states that are consistent with two or
more pure states in this toy theory. The toy theory does not reproduce quan-
tum theory however. A natural question to ask is whether there exists a model
having this property that can reproduce the predictions of quantum theory.
What if we can prove that pure states, in quantum theory, must correspond
to non-overlapping distributions over ontic states? This would imply that, no
matter how complicated the variables, λ, representing the ontic state are, we
would be able to deduce from λ what the pure quantum state is (since each
λ would only appear in the distribution of one pure quantum state). In other
words, the quantum state would be written into the underlying reality of the
world and we could assert that the quantum state is real. Harrigan and Spekkens
[21] introduced the following terminology: ψ-epistemic models are those in which
there exist pairs of pure quantum states for which the distributions over ontic
states overlap; ψ-ontic models are those in which the distributions over ontic
states are non-overlapping for any pair of pure quantum states. In ψ-ontic
models we can assert that the wavefunction is a real thing. The question is
whether all reasonable models reproducing the predictions of quantum theory
are ψ-ontic.
There has been a lot of interest in this subject recently. In 2008 Montina
[26, 27] showed that, under the very natural assumption that the evolution
of the λ is Markovian, the hidden variables must have at least 2N − 2 real
parameters where N is the dimension of the Hilbert space (this being the same
number of real parameters required to describe a pure quantum state). This
provides rather strong evidence for the reality of the quantum state. Then, in
2011 Pusey, Barrett, and Rudolph (PBR) [30] obtained the momentous result
that, under a certain separability assumption, distinct pure quantum states have
non-overlapping probability distributions thus providing the first proof that the
quantum state is a real thing in the terms outlined above. The separability
assumption employed by PBR is that independently prepared pure quantum
states correspond to a product of probability distributions over ontic states.
In this paper we show that, if three assumptions hold, then pure quan-
tum states have non-overlapping ontic support thus implying the reality of the
wavefunction. The key assumption employed here, ontic indifference, is quite
different from the separability assumption used by PBR. Additionally the proof
presented here only requires a single system (whereas PBR required multiple
copies of the system of interest). The assumption of ontic indifference is that
it is possible to implement any quantum transformation which does not affect
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any given pure quantum state, |ϕ〉, in such a way that the ontic states in the
support of that state are not affected.
At the cost of very slightly complicating matters we will also show that
can run the proof with an even weaker assumption. This is the assumption of
restricted ontic indifference in which it is assumed that there exists at least one
pure state, |0〉, such that quantum transformations leaving this state unchanged
can be implemented in a way that does not affect the ontic states in the ontic
support of |0〉. An example is the following. Consider a system consisting of
a quantum particle that can be in one of N + 1 boxes labeled n = 0 to N
such that we have an N + 1 dimensional Hilbert space (we do not consider
any internal structure in the boxes). Let |0〉 be the state corresponding to the
particle being localized in box 0. Consider further different possible quantum
transformations we might perform that leave |0〉 invariant. Then restricted ontic
indifference asserts that we can find an apparatus to implement implement these
quantum transformations in such a way that ontic states in the support of |0〉
are not affected by which quantum transformation we choose to implement.
Transformations that leave |0〉 invariant can all be implemented without actually
touching box 0. Indeed, boxes 1 to N could be at a great distance from box 0.
Viewed in this way restricted ontic indifference is a kind of locality assumption.
Restricted ontic indifference would follow if (i) all the ontic variables associated
with a localized particle are “situated” in the region where that particle is
localized, and (ii)these ontic variables are unaffected by transformations that
can be implemented without touching this region.
In fact the assumption of ontic indifference (and of restricted ontic indiffer-
ence) is violated by the Spekkens toy model mentioned above and, even more
interestingly, by a particular application of that model due to Elliott Martin
and Robert Spekkens (see [33]) which applies to interferometers of the sort that
we will consider later. In the model of Martin and Spekkens there are ontic
states associated with a path of an interferometer even when the particle goes
along the other path (i.e. it violates (i) from the preceding paragraph). This
can be viewed as taking a field picture of the ontic variables in which the vac-
uum has non-trivial structure. The assumption of restricted ontic indifference
is not violated in the de Broglie Bohm model for quantum mechanics in which
the ontic state is given by (ψ,x) where x is the actual position, in configura-
tion space, of the particles. Thus the result of this paper could be read in the
following way. While it is possible to construct ψ-ontic models that satisfy the
ontic indifference assumption, it is not possible to build ψ-epistemic models of
this nature. This, then, could be regarded as strong hint on how to construct
of ψ-epistemic models. In particular, it points to a field (rather than a particle)
ontology for ψ-epistemic models.
The main proof we will present requires that the Hilbert space associated
with the system in question is infinite dimensional. If this dimension, N + 1,
is finite, then we prove that any pair of pure states, |ϕ〉 and |ψ〉, for which
〈ϕ|ψ〉|2 ≥ N−1
N
must have non-overlapping distributions over the ontic states
(under the given assumptions). We will also discuss the case of a system, A,
with finite dimensional Hilbert space. We will show how, by introducing an
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infinite dimensional ancilla, B, in some fixed state, we are able to deduce that
different pure states for system A must correspond to different ontic states of
AB.
We will introduce the assumptions we use in Sec. 2. In Sec. 3 we will illustrate
the proof method using a Mach Zehnder interferometer. This works for the N =
2 case. Then, in Sec. 4, we will prove the main theorem using the assumption
of ontic indifference and assuming that the Hilbert space dimension can be
arbitrarily large. In Sec. 5 we will show how to replace the ontic indifference
assumption with the restricted ontic indifference assumption. Finally we show
how to deal with systems having a finite dimensional Hilbert space by using an
ancilla.
2 Assumptions
We make the following assumptions
Realism. Each time a system is prepared there exists an underlying state of
reality, λ, which we will call the ontic state.
Possibilistic completeness. The ontic state, λ, is sufficient to determine whether
any outcome of any measurement has probability equal to zero of occurring
or not.
Ontic indifference. Any quantum transformation on a system which leaves
unchanged any given pure state, |ψ〉, can be performed in such a way
that it does not affect the underlying ontic states, λ ∈ Λ|ψ〉, in the ontic
support of that pure state.
By the ontic support of a given state, |ψ〉, we mean the set, Λ|ψ〉, of ontic states,
λ which might be prepared when the given pure state is prepared (i.e. those
ontic states that have a non-zero probability of being prepared when the given
pure state is prepared).
Rather than assuming possibilistic completeness we might have made the
stronger assumption that λ determines the probability. However, it is sufficient
for our purposes that it only determines whether the probability is zero or non-
zero. Of course, in any model having hidden variables, λ, it is reasonable to
expect the hidden variables actually determine the probabilities for measure-
ment outcomes.
We assume that the system has arbitrarily large Hilbert space dimension. We
also assume that we can perform arbitrary unitary transformations and arbitrary
measurements on the system (or, at least, we assume that we can perform the
particular unitary transformations and measurements that we need to run the
proof). This is reasonable in view of the fact that arbitrary unitaries can be
implemented with beamsplitters and mirrors in the case of interferometry as
shown by Reck and Zeilinger [31] and, more generally, we can perform arbitrary
unitaries in quantum circuits given access to a universal gate set [12]. An
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Figure 1: This apparatus prepares |ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|a0〉 + |a1〉) which then impinges
on BS2 followed by two detectors B1 and B2. A φ = pi phase shifter can be
placed in path a1.
arbitrary measurement can then be implemented by having the appropriate
unitary followed by a measurement in some standard basis.
Similar assumptions to the first two assumptions appear in the work of Pusey,
Barrett, and Rudolph and it is difficult to imagine getting any traction on
the problem unless we make these assumptions (though, of course, it is still
interesting to investigate models that do not satisfy these assumptions). The
key assumption here is the third assumption. It turns out that we can weaken
this assumption and still run the proof. Thus we can, instead, assume
Restricted ontic indifference Any quantum transformation on a system which
leaves a particular given pure quantum state, |0〉, unchanged can be im-
plemented in such a way that it does not affect the underlying ontic states,
λ ∈ Λ|0〉, in the ontic support of |0〉.
This is a considerably weaker assumption and is very well motivated in the case
where |0〉 corresponds to a spatially localized particle as discussed in Sec. 1.
We will first run the proof using the assumption of ontic indifference then
show how we can, in fact, use the weaker assumption of restricted ontic indif-
ference.
3 Interferometric example
In popular accounts of quantum theory an interferometer is often used to argue
that something can be in two places at once. For example, consider the Mach
Zehnder interferometer in Fig. 1. The two beamsplitters, BS1 and BS2 are
50:50. We assume that the transformation effected at each beamsplitter is given
by the unitary matrix
1√
2
(
1 1
−1 1
)
(1)
Such that
|s1〉 −→ 1√
2
(|a0〉+ |a1〉) (2)
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at BS1 and
|a0〉 −→ 1√
2
(|b1〉+ |b2〉) |a1〉 −→ 1√
2
(|b1〉 − |b2〉) (3)
at BS2. We have chosen the integer subscript labeling here for later convenience.
We require, of course, that
〈sm|sn〉 = δmn 〈am|an〉 = δmn 〈bm|bn〉 = δmn (4)
We will assume that the path lengths are such that zero net phase is accu-
mulated as the particle goes along the internal paths of the interferometer. On
passing through the first, then the second beamsplitter it follows from the above
transformations that the evolution is
|s1〉 −→ 1√
2
(|a0〉+ |a1〉) −→ |b1〉 (5)
Thus the detector, B1, in path b1 will always fire and there is zero probability
that the B2 detector will fire. However, if we insert a phase shifter φ = pi in the
a2 path as indicated then the evolution is
|s1〉 −→ 1√
2
(|a0〉+ |a1〉) −→ 1√
2
(|a0〉 − |a1〉) −→ |b2〉 (6)
With the phase shifter in place the detector B2 will always fire and there is zero
probability that the detector B1 will fire.
Given this set up, one version of the popular argument for something going
both ways is the following. Let us try to account for this experiment in such a
way that the particle either goes along path a0 or a1. If this is the case then,
sometimes it must go along path a0. Consider a case in which it does go along
path a0. When the particle reaches BS2 it must go along path b1 if there is
no phase shifter and it must go along path b2 if the φ = pi phase shifter is in
place. Since it did not go along path a1 it does not “know” whether there is a
phase shifter in place or not. Hence, it cannot make the correct “decision”. This
shows that something must be going along both paths. We will now see how to
turn this argument into a formal argument for the reality of the quantum state.
This example can be used to show that the pair of states
|ϕ〉 = |a1〉 and |ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|a0〉+ |a1〉) (7)
must have non-overlapping ontic support given three assumptions in Sec. 2
above. We can prepare the state |ϕ〉 = |a0〉 by the apparatus shown in Fig.
2 and we can prepare the state |ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|a0〉 + |a1〉) by the apparatus shown
in Fig. 1 (in each case we consider the state at a time just before the system
passes through the location where the phase shifter may be inserted). Let Λ|ϕ〉
be the ontic support of the state |ϕ〉 = |a0〉. We now allow it to impinge on the
measurement apparatus constituted by BS2 and the two detectors B1 and B2.
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Figure 2: This apparatus prepares the state |ϕ〉 = |a0〉 which then impinges
on BS2 followed by two detectors B1 and B2. A φ = pi phase shifter can be
inserted in path a1.
Further, we have the phase shifter, φ, which can be inserted in path a1. We
have a choice of two setting for the phase shifter. Either φ = 0 (not inserted) or
φ = pi (inserted). Let ΛB1|ϕ〉[φ] ⊆ Λ|ϕ〉 be the subset of ontic states in the ontic
support of |ϕ〉 that have non-zero probability of giving rise to a click at detector
B1 given that the phase shifter in path a1 has setting φ. We are invoking
possibilistic completeness in asserting that this set is well defined. Likewise we
define ΛB2|ϕ〉[φ] ⊆ Λ|ϕ〉 to be the subset of ontic states in the ontic support of |ϕ〉
that have non-zero probability of giving rise to a click at detector B2 with phase
shifter setting φ. Inserting, or not inserting, the phase shifter has no affect on
the quantum state |ϕ〉 = |a0〉. Hence, it follows from the assumption of ontic
indifference that inserting, or not inserting, the phase shifter has no affect on
the ontic states, λ ∈ Λ|ϕ〉 in the support of |ϕ〉. It follows that
ΛB1|ϕ〉[φ = 0] = Λ
B1
|ϕ〉[φ = pi] = Λ
B1
|ϕ〉 (8)
ΛB2|ϕ〉[φ = 0] = Λ
B2
|ϕ〉[φ = pi] = Λ
B2
|ϕ〉 (9)
We have
ΛB1|ϕ〉 ∪ ΛB2|ϕ〉 = Λ|ϕ〉 (10)
as either detector B1 or B2 must fire (we are assuming 100% efficient detectors).
Now consider an ontic state, λ, in the intersection
ΛB2|ϕ〉[φ = 0] ∩ Λ|ψ〉 (11)
where Λ|ψ〉 is the ontic support of |ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|a0〉 + |a1〉). If φ = 0 and |ψ〉 has
been prepared then we know that detector B2 cannot fire. Hence, using (9),
ΛB2|ϕ〉[φ = 0] ∩ Λ|ψ〉 = ΛB2|ϕ〉 ∩ Λ|ψ〉 = ∅ (12)
(where ∅ is the empty set) since ΛB2|ϕ〉[φ = 0] are the ontic states that have non-
zero probability of causing B2 to fire. Likewise, if we consider the setting φ = pi
then we know that detector B1 cannot fire and hence
ΛB1|ϕ〉 ∩ Λ|ψ〉 = ∅ (13)
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Figure 3: This apparatus prepares the state |ψ〉 = α|a0〉 + β|a1〉 which then
impinges onto BS2 and BS3 and the three detectors B0, B1, B2. A φ = pi
phase shifter can be placed in path a1.
Using (10) this implies that
Λ|ϕ〉 ∩ Λ|ψ〉 = ∅ (14)
since
Λ|ϕ〉 ∩ Λ|ψ〉 = (ΛB1|ϕ〉 ∪ ΛB2|ϕ〉) ∩ Λ|ψ〉 = (ΛB1|ϕ〉 ∩ Λ|ψ〉) ∪ (ΛB2|ϕ〉 ∩ Λ|ψ〉) = ∅ (15)
We see here the crucial role the assumption of ontic indifference is playing since
if we had to keep the φ argument on ΛB1|ϕ〉 and Λ
B2
|ϕ〉 we could not use the two
different contexts in the same equation. It follows from (14) that the states |ϕ〉
and |ψ〉 have non-overlapping ontic support. This particular proof applies only
to a pair of states having |〈ϕ|ψ〉|2 = 1
2
. We would like to prove that any pair of
distinct pure states has non-overlapping ontic support.
Before we prove this we notice that the above proof can be modified to apply
to a pair of states having |〈ϕ|ψ〉|2 ≤ 1
2
. Consider the experiment in Fig. 3. Now
assume that the first beamsplitter, BS1, is uneven such that it prepares a state
|ψ〉 = α|a0〉+ β|a1〉 where α and β are real and positive and α ≤ β. After the
phase shifter the state will impinge on the beamsplitter BS3 in path a1. We set
the transmissivity, T , of this beamsplitter such that
|ψ〉 = α|a0〉+ β|a1〉 −→ α|a0〉+ α|a′1〉+ γ|b0〉 (16)
This is achieved if
√
Tβ = α. Note that if the phase shifter had been inserted
there would be a minus sign in front of the second term on the right. Rather
than sending in the state |ψ〉, we can send in the state |ϕ〉 = |a0〉 as shown
in Fig. 4. Since the amplitudes in front of the |a0〉 and |a′1〉 terms are now
equal we have probability zero of getting a detection in the B2 detector if φ = 0
(phase shifter not inserted) and probability zero of getting a detection in the B1
detector if φ = pi (phase shifter inserted). We define ΛBn|ϕ〉[φ] as being the subsets
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Figure 4: This apparatus prepares the state |ϕ〉 = |a0〉 which then impinges
onto BS2 and BS3 and the three detectors B0, B1, B2. A φ = pi phase shifter
can be placed in path a1.
of Λ|ϕ〉 which have non-zero probability of giving rise to a detector click in Bn
(where n = 0, 1, 2) when the phase shifter is set to φ. By ontic indifference, we
can put
ΛBn|ϕ〉[φ] = Λ
Bn
|ψ〉 (17)
We have that
ΛB0|ϕ〉 ∪ ΛB1|ϕ〉 ∪ ΛB2|ϕ〉 = Λ|ϕ〉 (18)
Now, we know that the probability of a click at detector B0 given that the state
was |ϕ〉 is zero. Hence,
ΛB0|ϕ〉 = ∅ (19)
Also, by the same reasoning as before, we have that
ΛB1|ϕ〉 ∩ Λ|ψ〉 = ∅ ΛB2|ϕ〉 ∩ Λ|ψ〉 = ∅ (20)
It follows from these equations that
Λ|ϕ〉 ∩ Λ|ψ〉 = (ΛB0|ϕ〉 ∪ ΛB1|ϕ〉 ∪ ΛB2|ϕ〉) ∩ Λ|ψ〉
= (ΛB0|ϕ〉 ∩ Λ|ψ〉) ∪ (ΛB1|ϕ〉 ∩ Λ|ψ〉) ∪ (ΛB2|ϕ〉 ∩ Λ|ψ〉) = ∅ (21)
Since we can choose transmissivity, T , for BS3 such that
√
Tβ = α whenever
β ≥ 1√
2
it follows that we can argue that the ontic support of the states |ϕ〉 and
|ψ〉 are non-overlapping whenever |〈ϕ|ψ〉|2 ≤ 1
2
.
4 General proof
The above examples were illustrated with interferometers. Now, for the sake of
generality, we will simply consider abstract Hilbert spaces without specifying a
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particular physical instantiation so that the argument is fully general. Consider
a N + 1 dimensional Hilbert space. We will need to allow N to be arbitrarily
large to run the proof (we will discuss ways around this later). We wish to show
that any pair of distinct pure states, |ϕ〉 and |ψ〉, have non-overlapping ontic
support. We can write
|ϕ〉 = |a0〉 |ψ〉 = α|a0〉+ β|a1〉 (22)
for some orthonormal basis {|an〉 : n = 0 to N} (having 〈am|an〉 = δmn). We
take α and β to be real and positive (we can always do this since we can absorb
any phase into the definition of |a0〉 and |a1〉).
We consider unitary transformations which leave |ϕ〉 unchanged (so that we
we can use the ontic indifference assumption). Such transformations take the
form
U =


1 0 0 . . .
0
0 V
...

 (23)
in the |an〉 basis where V is any unitary matrix acting in the subspace spanned
by |a1〉 to |aN 〉. In particular, we will consider the set of such transformations
U [m] =


1 0 0 . . .
0
0 V [m]
...

 (24)
for some choice of V [m]. All of these leave the state |ϕ〉 unchanged and hence
can be implemented in such a way that they leave ontic states λ ∈ Λ|ϕ〉 (in the
ontic support of |ϕ〉) unchanged by the ontic indifference assumption (we will
always assume that such transformations are implemented in such a way).
After the transformation U [m] we have
|ψ〉 = α|a0〉+ β|a1〉 −→ α|a0〉+ β|b[m]〉 (25)
where |b[m]〉 = V [m]|a1〉 is normalized and orthogonal to |a0〉. By appropriate
choice of V [m], the |b[m]〉 can be equal to any normalized vectors in the subspace
orthogonal to |a0〉. The |b[m]〉 vectors do not have to be orthogonal to one
another. We put
|c[m]〉 = α|a0〉+ β|b[m]〉 (26)
The states |c[m]〉 are normalized but not necessarily orthogonal to each other.
Following the transformation U [m] we subject the system to a maximal
measurement (i.e. a measurement corresponding to a non-degenerate observable)
onto a basis {|dn〉 : n = 0 to N} (we denote by Dn the measurement outcome
associated with the basis vector |dn〉). We wish to choose this measurement and
the V [n] such that:
For all n EITHER 〈dn|a0〉 = 0 OR 〈dn|c[n]〉 = 0 (27)
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(the OR is not exclusive - it is ok if both conditions are satisfied). First we will
show that this condition can be satisfied for any situation where β > 0 (so |ϕ〉
and |ψ〉 are distinct) and then we will show that it implies that disjoint pure
states have non-overlapping ontic support.
We will prove that we can actually satisfy the condition (27). We will work
in the {|dn〉 : n = 1 toN} basis. In this basis we put
|a0〉 = 1√
M
(0, 1, 1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
M
, 0, 0, . . . , 0) (28)
where M is the smallest integer such that
M ≥ 1
β2
(29)
(we require M ≤ N). Since α2 + β2 = 1 this is equivalent to
α2
β2
≤M − 1 (30)
We are free to choose the |b[m]〉 states to be any normalized states orthogonal
to |a0〉. We choose
|b[m]〉 = 1√
M − 1
α
β
|b[m]〉+ δ|d0〉 (31)
where |b[m]〉 is orthogonal to |d0〉. It follows from (30) that the first coefficient
on the right hand side is less than one. We choose the coefficient δ to guarantee
the state is normalized. It follows that
|c[m]〉 = α(|a0〉+ 1√
M − 1 |b[m]〉) + γ|d0〉 (32)
where γ = βδ. We wish to choose these states so that (27) is satisfied. One way
of doing this is if we can arrange things so that, in the {|dn〉 : n = 1 toN} basis,
|c[m]〉 = 1√
M − 1(0, 1, 1, . . . , 1,
m︷︸︸︷
0 , 1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
M
, 0, 0, . . . , 0) (33)
for m = 1 to M . Then 〈dn|c[n]〉 = 0 for n = 1 toM . For m = 0 and m =M +1
to N we put U [m] = U [1]. It follows that 〈dn|a0〉 = 0 for n = 0 and n =M + 1
to N . Hence, if we can choose |c[m]〉 as in (33) then condition (27) is satisfied.
To see that we can cho0se |c[m]〉 in this way we note that it follows from (28),
(32), and (33) after a little algebra that
〈a0|b[m]〉 = 0 for m = 0 to N (34)
(indeed, the choice in (31) was made to make this work). This is the only
condition that has to be satisfied - it ensures that we can find U [m] of the form
given in (24) such that |c[m]〉 = U [m]|ψ〉.
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Now we will show that it follows from (27) that |ϕ〉 and |ψ〉 have non-
overlapping ontic support (as long as they are distinct). Let ΛDn|ϕ〉 [m] be the
subset of the ontic support of |ϕ〉 whose members have a non-zero probability
of giving rise to measurement outcome Dn when we precede this measurement
by the unitary U [m]. By ontic indifference,
ΛDn|ϕ〉 [m] = Λ
Dn
|ϕ〉 [m
′] = ΛDn|ϕ〉 for all m,m
′ (35)
since the state |ϕ〉 is unaffected by U [m]. We also have
Λ|ϕ〉 =
N⋃
n=0
ΛDn|ϕ〉 (36)
since we must see some outcome for the measurement. Assume that we perform
the unitary U [n] and then measure in the {|dn〉} basis. Then
ΛDn|ϕ〉 ∪ Λ|ψ〉 = ∅ (37)
This is because (using (27)) EITHER 〈dn|ψ〉 = 〈dn|a0〉 = 0 in which we must
have case ΛDn|ϕ〉 = ∅ from which (37) follows, OR 〈dn|U [n]|ψ〉 = 〈dn|c[n]〉 = 0
in which case (37) follows since there can be no ontic states which both have
non-zero probability of giving rise to outcome Dn (since they belong to Λ
Dn
|ϕ〉)
and have zero probability of giving rise to this same outcome (as they belong
to Λ|ψ〉). It then follows that
Λ|ϕ〉 ∩ Λ|ψ〉 =
(
N⋃
n=0
ΛDn|ϕ〉
)
∩ Λ|ψ〉 =
N⋃
n=0
(
ΛDn|ϕ〉 ∩ Λ|ψ〉
)
= ∅ (38)
Hence the ontic supports of distinct states are non-overlapping. As long as the
Hilbert space dimension, N + 1, of the system in question is large enough then
however small β is, we can always find a M ≤ N such that the condition in (29)
is satisfied. Hence, in the limit of N → ∞, any pair of pure states must have
non-overlapping ontic support and therefore the quantum state is a real thing.
In the case that we are restricted to finite dimensional Hilbert spaces it follows
from the present argument using (29) that any pair of states for which
〈ϕ|ψ〉|2 ≥ N − 1
N
(39)
have non-overlapping ontic support.
5 Proof with restricted ontic indifference
As before we take the distinct pure states |ϕ〉 and |ψ〉. Previously we subjected
these states to a transformation U [m] then performed a measurement in the
{|dn〉} basis. Now we will complicate the experiment a little. First we subject
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these states to a unitary transformationW chosen such that W |ϕ〉 = |0〉. Next,
at this intermediate time, we perform the transformation U˜ [m] = WU [m]W †.
Then we perform the transformation W †. Finally we perform a measurement
in the {|dn〉} basis. In this new configuration we can consider the set ΛDn|ϕ〉 [m] ⊆
Λ|ϕ〉 of ontic states in the support of |ϕ〉 at the initial time that have non-zero
probability of giving rise to measurement output Dn later given that we are
to implement the transformation U˜ [m] at the intermediate time. We can also
consider the set of ontic states, ΛDn|0〉 [m] ⊆ Λ|0〉 at the intermediate time which
are in the ontic support of |0〉 and have a non-zero probability of giving rise to
measurement outcome Dn given that we implement transformation U˜ [m] at the
intermediate time. Now it must be the case that
Λ|ϕ〉 −→ Λ|0〉 (40)
under the evolution W . Hence, it must be true that
ΛDn|ϕ〉 [m] −→ ΛDn|0〉 [m] (41)
as the set on the right is just the time evolved version of the set on the left. By
restricted ontic indifference we have
ΛDn|0〉 [m] = Λ
Dn
|0〉 [m
′] = ΛDn|0〉 (42)
Hence
ΛDn|ϕ〉 [m] = Λ
Dn
|ϕ〉 [m
′] = ΛDn|ϕ〉 (43)
Thus we have the necessary property to run the proof as in the previous section.
6 Systems with finite Hilbert space dimension
Imagine that the system, A, under consideration necessarily has a finite Hilbert
space dimension, L. Can we still argue that its pure states are real? One way
to do this is to allow the use of an ancillary system, B, having arbitrarily large
N prepared in some initial state |1〉. We can ask whether |ϕ〉A and |ψ〉A for
system A must have non-overlapping ontic support. Then the states of the joint
system under consideration are |ϕ〉A|1〉B and |ψ〉A|1〉B. We can now argue as
before that these states must have non-overlapping ontic support. That is
Λ|ϕ〉A|1〉B ∩ Λ|ψ〉A|1〉B = ∅ (44)
for any pair of states |ϕ〉A and |ψ〉A. Assume that, in the case for independently
prepared pure quantum states, we have
Λ|ψ〉A|ϑ〉B = Λ|ψ〉A × Λ|ϑ〉B (45)
for any states |ψ〉A and |ϑ〉B for systems A and B respectively. Here the ×
represents the cartesian product of the sets. We will call this assumption ontic
product separability. It follows from (44) and (45) that
Λ|ϕ〉A ∩ Λ|ψ〉A = ∅ (46)
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This implies that any pair of pure states for the finite dimensional Hilbert space
must have non-overlapping ontic support. The ontic product separability as-
sumption in (45) is very natural if we admit the possibility of considering sub-
systems of the universe (such as A) in isolation from the rest of the universe
because then we would want to give the system its own ontic states. The as-
sumption in (45) is part of the PBR separability assumption [30]. If we do
not make the ontic product separability assumption then we can still make a
strong assertion based on (44). Assuming that system B is simply the rest of
the universe it follows from this equation that the universal ontic situation in
which we prepare |ϕ〉A for subsystem A is distinct from the universal ontic situ-
ation in which we prepare B. In the case were we do not assume ontic product
separability this is as strong a result as we can expect.
7 Violating ontic indifference
In Spekkens’s toy model a toy bit is modeled by a system having four underlying
ontic states. States in the theory correspond to having equal probability of two
of these four ontic states. We can imagine a state in the theory which is a equal
distribution over the first two ontic states (i.e. with equal probabilities). This
can be regarded as being analogous to the |0〉 state in quantum theory. Another
state would be an equal distribution over the second and third ontic state which
would be analogous to a superposition 1√
2
(|0〉 + |1〉). An equal distribution
over the first and fourth ontic state would be analogous to 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉) in
quantum theory. Measurements course grain over pairs of ontic states (and
remix the underlying states so it is impossible to prepare a given ontic state with
probability one). Transformations correspond to permutations of the underlying
ontic states. Thus, we can perform a transformation that interchanges the
first and second, and the third and fourth ontic states. This leaves the state
analogous to |0〉 unchanged but transforms the state analogous to 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉)
to the state analogous to 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉). It does so by interchanging the ontic
states in the support of the state analogous to |0〉. Thus, ontic indifference is
violated in the Spekkens toy model.
An application of this model, due to Martin and Spekkens [34], pertains to
interferometers of the sort ilustrated in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2. In this case there are
ontic variables associated with the occupation number of the path (take this to
be 0 or 1) and a phase associated with the path (take this to be 0 or pi). Even if
the occupation number is 0 there is still the phase variable which will be affected
by a phase shifter. Thus a path with no particle in it still has non-trivial degrees
of freedom associated with it. This allows the model to violate ontic indifference
in a local way.
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8 Previous work and discussion
In this paper we have been interested in theories that attempt to provide a
description of the underlying reality of the world. This is sometimes referred
to as providing an ontology and sometimes referred to as providing a hidden
variable interpretation. It is only in the context of such theories it is natural
to ask whether wave functions are real things. If we deny that there is an
underlying reality (assuming this is a consistent thing to do) then it does not
make sense to ask whether the wave function is a real thing.
The pilot wave model of de Broglie (see [2]) and Bohm [7] is an interesting
example of a theory that attempts to provide a description of the underlying
reality. In the usual interpretation of this model the ontic state is normally
taken to be given by λ = (ψ,X) where ψ is the wavefunction and X is the
position, in configuration space, of the particles (the particles are taken to ac-
tually exist). Thus, distinct pure states correspond to distinct ontic states and
so the pilot wave model is ψ-ontic. The influence of the pilot wave model of de
Broglie and Bohm on the study of quantum foundations has been significant.
Bell was motivated by the pilot wave model to ask whether any hidden variable
model must be nonlocal. Valentini was motivated by the pilot wave model to
ask whether any deterministic hidden variable model leads to signaling for non-
equilibrium distributions of the hidden variables [37]. Likewise, the question of
whether any hidden variable model must be ψ-ontic is also motivated by the
pilot wave model. The pilot wave model satisfies the restricted ontic indiffer-
ence assumption (it is a matter of calculation as to whether it satisfies ontic
indifference).
It is worth mentioning, as an aside, that the pilot wave model acts as a
counterexample to the often encountered claim that quantum theory does not
admit a hidden variable (or ontic) model. It does. The pilot wave model is
one example. Further, there exist versions of the pilot wave model capable of
reproducing enough quantum (field) theory to account for the standard model
(see, for example, [36]) so such models can account for all of present day quantum
phenomena.
Other examples of ψ-ontic models are the many worlds interpretation [14],
collapse models in the standard ontology where the wavefunction is taken to be
real [29, 17] (though the status of the flash ontology of Bell [5] is not so clear),
and the Beltrametti Bugajski model [6].
There have been other takes on the question of whether the wavefunction is
real. Aharonov and Vaidman [1] showed that it is possible to directly measure
the wave function with weak measurements using a protective measurement
scheme given only a single copy of the system. For this to work, however, it
is necessary that the wavefunction is an eigenstate of the acting Hamiltonian
and so a measurement onto the energy basis would enable us to deduce the
wavefunction. Nevertheless, the fact that the shape of the wavefunction can
be directly measured is quite remarkable. Fuchs regards the quantum state
as a degree of belief by taking a Bayesian interpretation of probabilities [15].
In particular, he and collaborators have shown that there can be situations in
15
which it is consistent for different agents to have different beliefs as to what
the state of a given system is and yet for them all to believe the system is in a
pure state [8]. There is clearly a tension between that result and any proof that
the wavefunction is a real thing which would be interesting to explore further.
Indeed, one can think of a quantum state as being represented by a list of
probabilities (corresponding to a complete set of fiducial measurements). Then
the only difference between two different pure quantum states is that they have
different probabilities for these fiducial measurements. If we adopt the point of
view that probabilities are nothing more than degrees of belief then it is clearly
possible for two agents to ascribe different pure states to the same situation. It
follows that there is a conflict between this view of probabilities and the three
assumptions used in this paper. Indeed, in the point of view developed by Fuchs
[15], the first assumption (that there is a hidden variable λ associated with a
system) is not true. Although this assumption was dubbed “realism” we should
admit that it is particular way of implementing the notion of realism. We may
have models do not deny realism in the broader sense of the word but which are
inconsistent with this assumption.
If we restrict ourselves to the case of a spin half particle then there are two
interesting models in the literature. Bell [4] constructed a simple hidden variable
model in which distinct pure spin half states correspond to hidden variables
represented by distinct unit vectors and the probability of seeing certain outcome
is given by the overlap between this vector and the vector representing the
measurement direction. This is a ψ-ontic model. On the other hand, Kochen
and Specker [22] gave an example in which a pure spin state corresponds to a
distribution of unit vector hidden variables. This is a ψ-epistemic model. Both
these models are restricted to standard spin measurements on spin half particles
and do not work for Hilbert space dimension greater than 2.
An intermediate question we can ask is what the size of the ontic space must
be to reproduce quantum theory. The toy bit in the Spekkens toy theory has
only four underlying ontic states. However, although it behaves in a similar
way to a qubit, it does not reproduce all predictions of quantum theory. A
preliminary result in this direction was provided by Galva˜o and the present
author [16]. It was shown that a single qubit can substitute for an infinite
number of classical bits in a certain information processing task suggesting that
we need an infinite number of ontic states to model a single qubit. Then it was
proven by the present author [20] that the number of ontic states required to
reproduce quantum predictions for even a single qubit must, indeed, be infinite.
This proof depends critically on the fact that there are an infinite number of
distinct pure quantum states for a qubit (there exist an infinite number of states
|ψ〉 = α|0〉+ β|1〉 since α and β vary continuously).
The proof in [20] only showed that there must be an infinite number of ontic
states in models reproducing quantum theory. As discussed in the introduction,
a big step forward was made by Montina [26] when he showed, by making some
very reasonable assumptions (most importantly he assumed that the model was
Markovian), that the hidden variables for a system with Hilbert space dimension
N must contain at least 2N − 2 real parameters - this being the same as the
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number of real parameters required to describe a state |ψ〉 = ∑ cn|n〉 after
normalization and an over all phase has been set. Further in [27], Montina
showed that in models for which the ontic space is specified by the minimum
number of real parameters, the ontic state is isomorphic to a vector in an N
dimensional Hilbert space and, further, this vector evolves according to the
Schroedinger equation. These results of Montina provide very strong evidence
under rather weak assumptions that the quantum state is real. Even if the
quantum state is not real, Montina’s results show that, in Markovian models,
there is something at least as complicated that is real.
Montina’s work falls just short of actually proving that quantum theory is
ψ-ontic. This was first proven by Pusey, Barrett, and Rudolph. The result
of PBR represents a significant breakthrough in quantum foundations and has
already been the subject of much study [18, 11, 25, 13, 32] (see in particular
Leifers illuminating discussion [23]). The key assumption that PBR make to get
their result is that the distribution over ontic states for independently prepared
pure quantum states should factorize.
It is worth remarking, in view of the general acclaim for the extraordinary
PBR result that, in some respects, the results of Montina are stronger than those
of PBR and, indeed, the present paper. By assuming less, Montina proves less.
However, his result is a bigger obstacle to finding worthwhile ψ-epistemic models
- namely those in which the ontic space is simpler than the pure quantum state
space. One of the biggest motivations to construct a ψ-epistemic model must be
to achieve a simpler description of reality than is afforded by the quantum state.
It is possible that, by violating the assumptions PBR and the present paper,
we can build ψ-epistemic models. Further, by violating Montina’s Markovian
assumption, we may even be able to build ψ-epistemic models that have fewer
real variables than required to describe the quantum state. Montina has shown
that, for Hilbert space dimension 2, it is possible to build a non-Markovian
model having only one (rather than two) real parameters in the ontic state. This
theme has been continued by Montina in [28]. Lewis, Jennings, Barrett, and
Rudolph [24], by violating the separability assumption of PBR, have shown how
to build a ψ-epistemic model reproducing quantum theory for any dimension
of the Hilbert space (this model, however, requires as many real parameters as
there are independent real parameters in the quantum state and it also violates
the ontic indifference assumption of the present paper).
The restricted ontic indifference assumption is a much stronger assumption
than either Montina’s Markovian assumption or PBR’s separability assumption.
The real result of this paper is, then, that any ψ-epistemic model must violate
restricted ontic indifference (and therefore also violate ontic indifference). The
fact that the Spekkens’s toy model violates ontic indifference suggests that it
is a step in the right direction. As demonstrated by the pilot wave model
for non-relativistic particles, ψ-ontic models need not violate restricted ontic
indifference. This property seems, then, to be a key difference between the two
approaches (though, of course, ψ-ontic approaches do not have to satisfy ontic
indifference).
One attitude one could take to the results of this paper and the work of
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Montina and PBR is that we should give up on trying to find interpretations
of quantum theory in which the wave function is not a real thing. However,
the benefits of finding an interpretation in which the wave function is not a real
thing may far outweigh the problems caused by having to violate the various
assumptions used in the afore mentioned work. In fact it is quite easy to vi-
olate the assumption of ontic indifference in hidden variable models. Further,
one can question how well motivated the PBR separability assumption (for in-
dependently prepared systems) is in view of the fact that, generically, we do
not expect hidden variable interpretations of quantum theory to be separable
when the systems are not independently prepared (see Spekkens discussion of
the PBR result in [34]). Further, as just mentioned, Montina has already em-
barked on a project looking for models in which the number of real parameters
required for the ontic state is fewer than required to specify the quantum state
(such models are necessarily ψ-epistemic). Further, the work of Spekkens and
collaborators [35, 3] points to the advantages of a ψ-epistemic approach. An
alternative, and even more radical, approach is that of Fuchs [15] and collab-
orators. In this approach the quantum state is not a real thing since different
agents can attribute different states for the same physical situation.
The area of realistic interpretations of quantum theory in which the quantum
state is not a real thing remains relatively unexplored. It represents a very
different take on the problem of interpretation to the old school approaches
of de Broglie and Bohm (the pilot wave model), of Everett (the many worlds
interpretation), and of Pearl, Ghirardi, Rimini, and Weber (the collapse models)
from the last century. The search for reasonable ψ-epistemic models (violating
the assumptions implicit in the various no-go theorems) is likely to be come an
increasingly exciting area of research in quantum foundations.
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